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uniquely valuable telecommunications assets, the prohibitions also amount to a reg-
ulatory taking. 
But whether viewed as a Loretto taking or a regulatory taking, the regulations 
proposed by the Commission in the NPRM would trigger a very large financial li-
ability for the (rl,vernment to pay just compensation to building owners. This liabil-
ity was certainly not foreseen or-intended by CODgress when it passed the Commu-
mcations Act, nor was there any indication at all in the act that Congress meant 
for the Commission to have the authority to issue regulations restricting the estab-
lished rights of real property owners. 
For these reaSODS, the Real Access Alliance has submitted comments to the Com-
mission stating that the proposals discussed in its NPRM cause a taking of property 
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 
Again, thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee on this impor-
tant subject. 
Professor Dinh. 
STATEMENT OF VIET D. DINH, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF 
LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
Mr. DINH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Conyers, 
members of the committee, thank you very much for the oppor-
tunity to be here, and to Mr. Rosenthal for providing a very 
thoughtful analysis and framing the issues. I appear today on be-
half of the Smart Building Policy Project, although I should note 
that I appear as an analyst and not as an advocate. So please don't 
hold what I say against them. These are my positions as to how 
I see the constitutional issues in this case and not necessarily the 
position that their counsel, or the members of the Project would 
necessarily take. -
It seems to me that the issues posed by this hearing and by the 
FCC's notice of proposed rulemaking are twofold. One, whether 
there would be an unconstitutional -taking of property and, two, 
whether the FCC has authority to effect such a nile. And I start 
with the fIrst by noting that Chairman Canady and Mr. Rosenthal 
are perfectly correct and cogent in their analysis of the Loretto de-
cision, and with that I have absolutely no quibble with the analysis 
set forth there, nor with the court's decision in Loretto. I think it 
is correct. 
By the same token, I believe that the 11th Circuit's decision on 
the takings issues in 47 USC section 224, the mandatory access 
provisions with respect to the utilities, is also correct. That works 
as a taking because those statutory provisions require the utilities 
to open up their lines, open up their utilities, their rights of way 
and their premises which they own or control to uninvited telc-
communications providers. 
What the FCC proposes, as I understand in "this case, is not such 
a "mandatory access requirement." It is not forcing building owners 
to open up their doors to uninvited telecommunications providers. 
Rather, it is simply a requirement that should building owners 
open up- their door to any telecommunications provider, then they 
would have to open up their door to other telecommunications pro-
viders on nondiscriminatory terms. 
So in that sense, I think that this case poses a potential conflict, 
if you will, that requires careful line drawing between two lines of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Loretto line of cases, which I 
think is jurisprudentially valid and very sensible, and also another 
line of cases, cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel, which says that it 
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is not a taking where you open up your premises for public accom-
modation to require nondiscrimination on bases of race, religion 
and gender and the like, as announced by Congress in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. , 
Analogously, if you open up a mall to public access, as Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robbins, the court says you cannot discriminate 
against certain speech because you happen to disagree with that 
speech. If you open it up, you have to open it up equally, and that 
is simply a condition of the access provisions. 
In that sense I think that the case of Yee v. Escondido is quite 
apt, and that case specifically addressed the the discussion in foot-
note 17 of Loretto, which Mr. Rosenthal referred to regarding the 
conditioning of access on a nonpayment of rental for the cable tele-
vision line that case. In Yee v. Escondido, the court made very clear 
that the Loretto does not seek to address cases like Heart of At-
lanta Motel. Indeed, it cited it, or cases like the cases that uphold 
rent control laws or fire codes, which, in some sense, require a 
physical intrusion. By requiring a fire detector to be on a property, 
that is a physical occupation of space, yet those cases are looked 
under a regulatory taking point of view as the court did in Yee v. 
Escondido rather than on a physical taking line of case as in 
Loretto. And the court in Yee specifically distinguished those cases. 
Indeed, Yee itself concerned a statutory and ordinance scheme 
whereby the landowner in that case, an owner of mobile home 
parks, did not have an opportunity to object to the tenants in the 
mobile home park, and so it specifically addresses the points that 
are relevant to this case. 
That said, I think it is a very hard constitutional question, and 
the task of line drawing rests with the Supreme Court. So I do not 
venture to propose a conclusion here. What I do note, however, is 
that even if there is a physical taking or a taking of any type, there 
is adequate provisjon in the FCC's contemplation for just com-
pensation. I suspect that that would be where most of your ques-
tions would be: how the FCC would be able to effect such a just 
compensation under a nondiscriminatory regime. I am sure that all 
three of us would be happy to answer questions in that regard, and 
I am sure the economists in the next panel would be happy to pro-
vide the details in that regard. 
Mr. CANADY. Thank you, Professor Dinh. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dinh follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIET D. DINH, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 
Thank you very much for this opportunity to comment on the constitutional issues 
raised by the pending FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on nondiscriminatory 
telecommunications access to multi-tenant environments. I note that there are sev-
eral bills pending in Congress that seek to ensure the same result as the proposals 
under consideration by the FCC. 
I am an Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center 
where I specialize in constitutional law, among other things. Prior to joining the fac-
ulty, I was a law clerk to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and to Judge Laurence Silberman on the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit. I 
am currently writing JUDICIAL AUTHORITY ANn SEPARATION OF POWERS; A REF-
ERENCE GUIDE To THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, to by published by Greenwood Press. 
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Although I appear on behalf of the Smart Building Policy Project,l I am here as 
an analyst and not an advocate. My analysis, therefore, is not necessarily the posi-
tion of the Project or any of its members; rather, it is simply how I see the constitu-
tional issues in this matter. -
The takings issue posed by this hearing's inquiry concerning the FCC's Notice 
consists of two Prin~k;~ questions: (1) whether a nondiscriminatory access require-
ment constitutes a . g of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) even if such a requirement IS con-
stitutionally sound, whether the FCC has authority to promulgate the proposed 
rules. I will address each question in turn. For the reasons detailed below, I con-
clude that the nondiscriminatory access proposals are constitUtionally sound and 
that the FCC has the statutory authority to promulgate them. 
I. The ConstitutWTUllity of a NondiscrimiTUltory Access Requirement 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that private property shall 
not "be taken forrublic use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The 
proper analysis 0 the proposed FCC action, accordingly, has two component steps: 
(A) whether a nondiscnminatory access requirement constitutes a taking of private 
property; and (B) if it is a taking of property, whether the property owners would 
not receive just compensation. Only if both inquiries yield affirmative answers 
would there be a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
A. Taking. 
The Supreme Court has established two tests to determine whether a government 
action constitutes a taking. A permanent physical occupation of private property is 
a taking per se, see, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 426 (1982); the only question is whether there would be adequate compensa-
tion. By contrast, other government regulations not involving a permanent physical 
occupation, such as conditions on the use of private property, are takings only if 
they fail the multifactor balancing test applicable to regulatory takings. See, e.g., 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
Whether a nondiscriminatory access requirement constitutes a permanent phys-
ical occupation that is a per se taking under Loretto is a close question, one that 
the Supreme Court has not directly addressed. Nor has my research revealed any 
holding or discussion in lower court opinions directly on point. 
Unlike the proposed nondiscriminatory access requirement, if the FCC were to re-
quire building owners to open up their property for any and all telecommunications 
companies to install their equipment, such a requirement would constitute a per se 
taking. That much is evident from the facts of Loretto itself, and it matters not that 
the intrusion is minimal-that the ceded area is no "bigger than a breadbox." 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16. In that regard, I think the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit correctly held in Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 
1328 (l1th Cir. 1999), that the mandatory access provision of 47 U.S.C. § 224 is a 
per se taking. (The court further held that the taking is constitutional because there 
are adequate procedures for just compensation, a bubject to which I return below 
in Part B.) 
A nondiscriminatory access requirement of the typ(. proposed by the FCC, how-
ever, is substalltively different, Instead of mandating that a property owner open 
his property to outsiders, a nondiscrimination provision simply requires that, should 
the owner open his property to any outsider, he must also entertain others. The pro-
posal, therefore, is analogous to the nondiscrimination requirement of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which the Supreme Court held not to constitute a tak-
ing of property in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 
(1964). Heart of Atlanta Motel, of course, is not directly apposite because Title VII 
requires general access to places of public accommodation only, and the FCC J?ro-
posal would provide limited access to property retained for private use. This distmc-
tion, however, turns on the public p\ll'POse of the government action. Witb respect 
to whether the action constitutes a taking, however, it seems to me that the two 
nondiscriminatory access requirements are quite analogous. 
So viewed, nondiscrimination is but a governmental condition on a property own-
er's decision to provide some carriers access to his property. Even where such a con-
dition would work a permanent physical intrusion, the condition would constitute 
1 The members of the growing Smart Building Policy Project currently include the American 
Electronics Association, the Association for Local Telecommunications Services, AT&T Corp., the 
Competition Policy Institute, the Information Technology Association of America, the Inter· 
national Communications Association, MCI WorldCom, NEXTLINK Communications, TeJigent, 
Inc., Winstar Communications, Inc., and the Wireless Communications Association. 
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a taking only if there is not a sufficient nexus to the government's authority to regu-
late the underlr·ng action. Thus, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commissum, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987 , the Commission conditioned the grant of a bUilding pennit upon 
provision of a permanent easement to provide access to public beaches. The Court 
held that a permanent access easement is a permanent physical occu~ation under 
Lorett, see id. at 831-32; however, that holding did not end the analysIs. The ease-
ment requirement constituted a taking only because, as a condition, it did not bear 
a sufficient nexus to the government's reason for regulating the construction of the 
residential home. See id. at 836-37. The Court later explained that a sufficient 
nexus exists if there is a "rough proportionality' between the "nature and extent" 
of the condition and the "impact" of the underlYIng activity. Dolan v. City of Tigard 
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Following these guidelines, numerous courts have upheld 
permanent access easements as reasonable conditions. See, e.g., Curtis v. Town of 
South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 65~0 (Me. 1998) (upholding a fire safety re~a­
tion that conditioned approval of a subdivision plan upon the developer bUilding a 
fire pond and granting the town an easement to maintain and use the pond); 
Grogan v. Zoning Board of Town of East Hampton, 633 N.Y.S.2d 809, 810 (App. Div. 
1995) (upholding zoning board's decision to condition grant of pennit to build addi-
ti~n ~nto house UJ)On owner's granting scenic and conservation easement), appeal 
dISmISSed, 670 N.E.2d 228 (N.Y. 1996); Sparks v. Douglas County, 904 P.2d 738, 
745-46 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (upholding planning commission's decision to condi-
tion approval of short plat appli~ations upon dedication of rights of way for road im-
provement). Just 80 WIth the FCC's proposed nondiscriminatory access requirement. 
Such a nondiscrimination condition bears a sufficient nexus to the FCC's authority 
to rettnlate property owners' provision of access to telecommunication carriers; the 
nondiscrimination condition is proportional to the impact of the landowners' actions, 
that is perpetuatjng local telecom monopolies through discriminatory access. 
Another. analogous line of cases is the rule in antitrust law that a dominant mar-
ket participant must provide competitors access to essential facilities it owns. See, 
e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-34 (7th Cir. 1983). Despite calls from com-
mentators,2 my research has uncovered no case holding that such a requirement 
constitutes I! per se taking under Loretto. In Consolidated Gas Co. of Florida v. City 
Gas Co. of Florida, 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), vacated as moot, 
499 U,S. 915 (1991), the Eleventh Circuit, 8ittin~ en banc, affirmed a district court 
decision that invoked the essential facilities rationale and ordered the respondent 
to sell wholesale gas to the petitioner at reasonable prices-over the objections of 
two dissenting judges that such relief raised Fifth Amendment concerns, see id. at 
1312-20, and specifically that it would work a per se taking under Loretto. See id. 
at 1315 n.52. 
In sum, whether a nondiscriminatory access requirement is a per se taking is an 
open question. Any unqualified answer in the affirmative is in error because it gives 
conclusive weight to Loretto and ignores the competing principles set forth in cases 
like Heart of Atlanta Motel and Nollan-. 1 do not venture a conclusion here because 
the question requires resolvin~ the conflict between two competing lines of cases, 
both of which are jurisprudentially sensible and legally valid'a task of line drawing 
that ultimately rests with the Supreme Court. In ~y event, such a speculation is 
not nece88ary to my ultimate conclusion that the FCC proposals are constitutionally 
sound. 
If a nondiscrimination access requirement does not work a per se taking, the pro-
posed FCC action is likely to be upheld 1\8 a permissible regulation of the uae of 
private property under the "ad hoc, factual inquiries" into the factors summarized 
m Penn Central: the character of the government action, the economic impact of 
that action, and its interference, if any, with investment·backed expectations. See 
438 U.S. at 124. First, the proposed regulations are designed to further the public 
interest, as defined by Congress, "to foster competition in local telecommunication 
markets." Notice of Proposeii Rulemaking, ,1(released July 7, 1999); see 47 U.S.C. 
§ 251. The Court "has often upheld substantial regulation of an owners' use of his 
own property where deemed necessary to promote the public interest." Loretto, 458 
U.S. at 426. Second, the economic impact of the proposed reguIatir.ns is minimal, 
at most. Property owners will be directly compensated for the use of property they 
own and control and indirectly compensated, through rents, for the use of property 
they own but is controlled by a communications carrier. Third, any expectations 
~See Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. &: J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilitiu. 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 
122740 (1999) (argumg that if a court were to treat Microsoft's operating system software 88 
an essential facility and were to require Microsoft to inelude Netscape's internet browser in that 
operating system, the government would have taken Microsoft's property, under the per lie rule 
in Loretto, and would be required to pay just compeMBtlon). 
--- - -_._--------
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backed by the owners' investments are in the use of their property as real estate. 
These expectations are minimal, if not nil, with respect to ducts ana roof space dedi-
cated to utility equipment. Any fortuitous opportunity they now have to participate 
in the telecommunications business (either as competitors or as lessors of facilities) 
results from the deregulatory program that the FCC has pursued following a con-
gressional directive. In any event, any investment-backed expectations the owntJrs 
may have in telecommunications are limited because the owners are operating in 
a field (telecommunications andlor transacting with communications carriers) that 
is heavily regulated by the federal government. Such regulations are constantly in 
flux, rendering unreasonable any assumption or expectation that a nondiscrim-
inatory access requirement or other regulation on the use of their property would 
not be imposed in the future. 
B. Compensation. 
Even if, arguendo, the proposed FCC regulations constitute a taking, the analysis 
does not end. "The Fifth AD'lendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it 
llroscribes taking without just colllpensation." Williamson County Regional Planning 
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). "If the government has pro-
vided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process 
yields just compensation, then the property owner has no claims against the govern-
ment for a taking." [d. at 195. According to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the 
FCC contemplates two primary avenues for effecting nondiscriminatory access to 
multi-tenant environments for communications carriers. First, the FCC mar require 
incumbent local exchange carriers to provide competitors with access, at Just, rea-
sonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, to the conduits and rights of way that they 
control (through leaseholds or other access arrangements) in the buildin~s. See No-
tice of ProJ?C?sed Rulemaking, "36 48. Second, the FCC may require building own-
ers to proVlde competitive 10000exchange carriers equal access, at nondiacriminatory 
rates, to their property for the purpose of installing transmission equ!p'ment tQ serv-
ice tenants. See id. '60. Under either avenue, the FCC may ensure that a reason-
able, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation emt[s] at the time 
of the taking." WiiUiamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. 
First, should the FCC require incumbent carriers to provide access to the conduits 
lind rights of way that they control, 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) permits the carriers to assess 
charges for such access. The statute sets forth a clear formula for the carrier to re-
cover costs of providing access, through an allocation of the costs of providing both 
usable and unusable space in the conduits and rights of way. The provision further 
requires the FCC to promulKate regulations to govern the access charges should 
"the parties fail to resolve a dispute over such charges." Id. § 224(eXl). "Such regula-
tions shall ensure that a utility charges just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
rates for pole attachments." Id. 
This statutory procedure guarantees the incumbent carrier ample opportunities to 
obtain just compensation for providing access. In the first instance, it may levy com-
pensatory charges according to the prescribed cost allocation formula. Should there 
be a dispute as to such charges, it may negotiate at arms length with the competi-
tive carrier to set appropriate rates. Finally, should the dispute not be resolved, the 
FCC, after appropnate complaints an~roceedings, may determine rates that are 
"just, reasonable, and nondiscriminato pursuant to duly promulgated regulations. 
On its face, therefore, the statute satie es the just compensation requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment. I suppose that there is a possibility that a particular agency de-
termination of a "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" rate would not provide, 
in the final analysis, "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment. Such risk, 
however, inheres in every governmental action, and the remote _possibility does not 
render the FCC proposal facially unconstitutional. See Gulf Power, 187 F.3d at 
133738. In any event, the FCC's rate determination, like other agency actions, is 
subject to judicial review; the incumbent carrier, therefore, is afforded full protection 
against the risk of such administrative error. See id. at 1338. 
Second, with respect to access to areas owned and controlled solely by property 
owners, the FCC proposes that the owners be paid "nondiscriminatory" rates for 
such access. The Commission is currently seeking comments on how such rates 
should be determined, so the precise parameters of such compensation are not fixed. 
I note, however, that the Commission proposes that property owners be permitted 
"to obtain from a new entrant the same compensation it has voluntarily agreed to 
accept from an incumbent LEC." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ,60. Such reliance 
on the arms-Ien~h bargain struck with incumbent carriers seems to me a reaso,p.-
able approximation of the fair market value of access and thus would provide just 
comp'!;nsation for any taking of property. To the extent that changed circumstances 
or different market conditions may render such original compensation an unreliable 
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indicator of fair value, the Commission has also sought commenu on how to tailor 
any nondiscriminatory access requirement to ensure consumer choice uwithout in. 
fringing on the rights of property owners." rd. , 55. Thus, at this point, there is little 
reason to suspect that the procedures for setting nondiscriminatory access charges 
would not ensure a fair, certain and adequate process for property owners to obtain just compensation for any taking of their property. 
II. The Commission's Authority to Promulgate the Proposed Rules 
. The nondiscriminatory access proposals by the FCC also raise certain separation 
of powers considerations concerning the Commission's authority to promulgate the 
proposed regulations. For reasons outlined below, I conclude that the Commission 
would likely be found to have such authority. 
As an initial matter, there is little question that, shorn of the Fifth Amendment 
implications of the proposed requirements, the Commission has authority to regu. 
late access to multi-tenant enVIrOnments for the provision of telecommunications 
services. With respect to facilities controlled by incumbent carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 224 
explicitly authorizes th, Commission to require that a utility provide access to any 
"duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned. or controlled br it," id. §224(f')(I), and the stat-
ute defines utility to include communications earners, See id. § 24(aXl). With reo 
spect to property owned and controlled by the building owners, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152 
grant the Commission authority to regulate the transmission of interstate wire or 
radio communication. The definition of wire communication includes "all instrumen' 
talities, facilities, apparatus, and services. . . incidental to such transmission" and 
thus contemplates property used for the p~se of providing interstate communica· 
tion services. Id. § 153(52). And 47 U.S.C. tf 151, 152 further grant the Commis· _ 
sion authority to regulate persons engaged in interstate wire communication, 811 
that term is defined. above. Building owne~l .accordingly, are persons engaged. in 
interstate wire communication by virtue of Uleir control or denial of access to the 
facilities incidental to the transmission of such communication. Finally, the Com-
mission has authority under 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) to "make such rules and regulations, 
. . . not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be nece8SllJ-Y in the execution of iu 
functions" and under 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) to "[m)a1te such rules and regulations and 
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be nec-
essary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Although the authority under the 
provisions is frequently termed "anclllary jurisdiction" in the telecommunications 
parlance, it is more aptly analogized to a feneral necessary and proper authority 
to effectuate the purposes and provisions 0 the statute. See PETER HUBER, ET AL., 
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw § 3.3.1, at 221 (2d ed. 1999). 
The analysis into agency authority, however, is further complicated by the pres-
ence of Fifth Amendment considerations as outlined above. In Bell Atlantic Tele· 
phone Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. Circuit reviewed orders 
of the Commission that required. carriers to set aside a portion of their central of-
fices for use by their competitors-known as the physical co-location orders. The j)e-
titioners challenged the Commission's authority to promulgate the regulations. The 
court recognized that it would normally defer to the Commission's statutory inter-
pretation under the principles announced in Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), but held that it would not do so in this case because the Commission's 
interpretation raised substantial constitutional questions regarding executive en-
croachment on Congress' exclusive powers to appropriate funds. See Bell Atlantic, 
24 F.3d at 1445. Specifically, the court found that the FCCs orders amounted to a 
forced access requirement, and thus in all cases "will necessarily constitute a tak· 
ing" under Loretto. See id. at 1445-46 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985». To avoid this perceived constitutional 
difficulty, the court held that the Commission's authority to order physical co-Ioca-
tion must either be found in express statutory language or must be a necessary im-
plication from that language, such that "the grant [of authority) itself would be de· 
feated unless [takings] power were implied." Id. at 1446 (quoting Western Union Tel. 
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 120 F. 362, 373 (C.C.W.D.Pa. 1903), afl'd, 195 U.S. 540 
(1904» (alterations in original). Finding this "strict test of statutory authority made 
necessary by the constitutional implications of the Commission's action" not satis-
fied, the court held that the Commission lacked authority to issue the physical co-
location orders. Id. at 1447. 
Upon closer analysis, however, the holding of Bell Atlantic does not apply to the 
nondiscriminatory access requirements proposed. by the FCC. First, the regulation 
of areas controlled by a communications carrier follow from the express authoriza-
tion to order a phYSical taking found in 47 U.S.C. § 224. As to that portion of the 
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proposed rule, therefore, the "strict test" of Bell Atlantic is satisfied.3 Second, the 
requirement of nondiscriminatory access to areas owned and controlled by landlords, 
unlike the forced access orders at issue in Bell Atlantic, will not unecessarily con-
stitute a taking." As I concluded above, whether the requirement will be judged 
under the Loretto standard or the competing standards applied in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel or Nollan is a close question. In Loretto the Court rejected the suggestion that 
the installation of cable equipment was not a per se taking because the property 
owner retained the right to cease renting his property to tenants and thereby to 
avoid the requirement. It explained that ua landlord's ability to rent his property 
may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to compensation for a physical 
occupation." Loretto; 458 U.S. at 439 n.17. However, the COmmission is contemplat-
ing regulations that would ensure property owners receive just compensation for 
an)' physical occupation of their property. And the Commission has &uthority to re-
qwre new entrants into a building to pay just compensation to property owners 
under 47 U.S.C. §§ 154m, 303(r), as such regulations are "reasonablr. ancillary to 
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilitie~," United 
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). In particular, the stat-
ute reguires the Commission to foster competition in local telecommunications mar-
kets. On Bell Atlantic's reasoning, therefore, a reviewing court should grant Chevron 
deference to the Commission's interpretation of its authority under the statute. 
As Professors Baumol and Merrill explained in assessing whether ~rovisions of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 effect an unconstitutional taking: [Als long as 
the Act includes mechanisms which can provide just compensation for any taking 
claims found to have merit, these claims, too, should provide no basis to halt the 
implementation of the Act in the manner deemed most appropriate by regulators 
to achieve its purpose." William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory 
Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 
1996,'72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037, 1056 (1997). 
,. . ,. 
In the final analysis, I conclude that the nondiscriminatory access proposals are 
constitutionally BOund and that the FCC has the statutory authority to promulgate 
them. Thank you. 
Mr. CANADY. Professor Eagle. 
STATEMENT OF STEVEN J. EAGLE, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
Mr. EAGLE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to speak to the subcommittee today. My name is Steven 
Eagle. I am a professor of law at George Mason University, and I 
am here today in my capacity as a scholar whose interest is in the 
intersection of property and constitutional law. 
I think that as Mr. Conyers had mentioned earlier, Congress cer-
tainly is well advised to try to facilitate ways to have universal ac-
cess to all kinds of information and an expansion of our tele-
eommunications system to do that. However, we have to do that, 
of course, within- the context of fifth amendment protections for 
property rights. After all, the purpose of the fifth amendment is not 
to rule out government activities because they are impermissible 
but, to the contrary, to reconcile permissible and even laudable gov-
ernment activities with the requirements of the Constitution that 
the property rights of individuals be respected. 
Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, you quoted parts of 
Justice Marshall's Loretto opinion that I otherwise would have 
3Because 47 U.S.C. §224{fXl) requires a carrier to provide access to ducts and conduits 
"owned or controlled" by it, Congress clearly contemplated that the FCC would regulate property 
that is merely controlled by a carrier and therefore owned by a third party. Thus, even if the 
proposed regulations based upon § 224 necessarily effect a taking without just compensation to 
property owners in every case, CO~B8 in §224 has expressly granted the FCC the power to 
effect such takings and hss concomitantly authorized the expenditures needed to satisfy those 
owners' claims for just compensation. 
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quoted here. Certain!y the Loretto case has to be the beginning of 
our inquiry. The FCC and other groups that wish to impose man-
datory access have the obligation, I think, to distinguish why the 
Loretto case should not be govern in this situation. 
Loretto, it is true, does not affect the economic regulation of own-
ers of different aspects of a parcel, such as landlord and tenant, 
within the context of an ongomg relationship. That was recognized 
in the telecommunications field by the Supreme Court in FCC v. 
Florida Power in 1987, where the Court made it clear that the FCC 
did have the right to regulate a carrier's relationship with a cable 
company it had voluntarily allowed access to its lines. However, I 
think it is important to note that Courts of appeals have drawn the 
line at that. In subsequent cases where there has been a mandated 
access to utility company lines, the courts have said that this is an 
impermissible taking, or would be an impermissible taking, unless 
there were just compensation. 
The two leading cases are the Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit 
decision in Bell Atlantic v. FCC, which is the co-location case of 
1994, and, most on point, Gulf Power Company v. United States, 
1999. There, the 11th Circuit adjudicated the extension of the Pole 
Attachments Act to provide for mandatory access to equipment. 
The Eleventh Circuit said that it was the voluntary nature of the 
access in Florida Power was determinative and if there was not a 
voluntary relationshi,e, the takings clause is violated. 
I think that cases hke Heart or Atlanta and Yee, with respect, are 
not quite on point. For instance, in the Heart of Atlanta case, the 
government was vindicating a Civil Rights statute, and more im-
portant for our immediate purpose, it was vindicating a person's 
right to have a license in a hotel room for a one night period or 
a few nights. This is not the kind of permanent physical occupation 
that Loretto contemplated. Likewise, Yee v. City of Escondido, a 
case reviewed by the Supreme Court only to resolve a conflict be-
tween State and Ninth Circuit jurisprudence having to do with mo-
bile homes, is a rather anomalous case. The Court vindicated the 
right of a mobile homeowner to sell his unit to another and vindi-
cated rent control principles generally. Yee ought not to be ex-
tended beyond that. 
I want to emphasize two elements in Professor Dinh's written 
testimony. The first has to do with exclusivity. He asserts that the 
FCC could reasonably simply take the charges of an existing car-
rier as a baseline to determine reasonable charges for a new_ car-
rier. Well, you can't unscramble the omelet that easily. Presum-
ably, an exclusive relationship allows all kinds of economic factors 
at work that f.iecemeal relationships don't. Pricing is a subject for 
the next pane, but I suggest that would be extremely difficult. 
Second, Professor Dinh says there is little reason to suspect that 
procedures used by the FCC for just compensation would not be 
fair. With respect, I have testified before this subcommittee earlier, 
and many others have as well regarding the problem of providing 
adequate State procedures to deal with State condemnations or 
State re£Ulatory takings prior to litigation in the Federal courts. I 
submit tnat a procedure where the FCC engages in determinations 
before Federal courts can hear a case will be, in effect, the creation 
of another Williamson County ripeness doctrine within the Federal 
